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A COMMON ENTERPRISE: LAW AND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CIVIL AND 
HEAVENLY REALMS IN THE WRITINGS OF JOHN CALVIN 
 
Kenneth L. Townsend 
 
 
Removed as they are from John Calvin’s day in time and metaphysical 
assumptions, the modern and post-modern worlds have experienced an 
inversion of ultimate values.  The common ends that once united spiritual and 
civil realms have been privatized as those ends have come to be seen as 
controversial and plural, rather than unifying and common.  Acknowledging 
the diversity of ends resulted in increased attention to uniform rules.  Since 
there was no longer agreement about what teloi mattered for society, law 
gradually lost its aspirational features and became simply a way to limit and 
punish uncivil and criminal behavior.  
The formal separation, but ultimate unity, of civil and heavenly 
spheres, of norm with vision, articulated by Calvin, allowed him to be both 
idealistic and realistic about law’s capacity.  Calvin the realist, more so than 
any prominent theologian, recognized the pervasiveness of human sinfulness 
and chastens any legal or political system that assumes the perfectibility of 
humankind.  Calvin the idealist, however, reminds us of law’s potential to 
educate individuals in God’s will and to cultivate virtuous action in the 
process.  
The development of Western legal and political institutions in the 
modern and contemporary eras likely benefited from Calvin’s recognition of 
the law’s limits as well as its capacities.  If there is anything that the 
contemporary world should draw from Calvin’s writing on the law, it is that 
law is a richer resource than we often realize.  At its best, it performs multiple 
functions.  Law limits and enables; it punishes but also educates.  
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One of the chief accomplishments of the modern world has been to 
base legal rights in universal principles of justice rather than on any particular 
history, status, or faith. This secularization of law has been revealed and 
animated by the legal and political theory of liberalism, including liberal 
theory’s commitment to reason, its aspirations for universality, and its 
public/private distinction, among other things. 
There are, of course, many good reasons the secular, procedural law 
of liberal theory has risen to prominence in the West. It often does a better 
job acknowledging pluralism and accommodating diversity than conceptions 
of law deeply rooted in particular communities or conceptions of “the good.”  
Rights, once the product of divine favor or royal caprice, have found new 
grounding in rational principles of justice rather than through common 
history or shared narratives, meaning that systemic injustice and entrenched 
inequality face an increasingly higher burden of proof to justify their 
existence.   
Intellectual historian Mark Lilla has described a process by which the 
unity of the pre-modern world has come to be 
replaced by a new approach to politics focused exclusively on 
human nature and human needs. A Great Separation took 
place, severing Western political philosophy decisively from 
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cosmology and theology. It remains the most distinctive 
feature of the modern West to this day.1 
Lilla largely credits Hobbes for ushering in this Separation that 
applied reason rather than theology and addressed material rather than 
spiritual concerns,2 although theologians like Luther likely played an 
important role in helping create an autonomous, secular, public sphere that 
viewed law’s role as one concerned with social control, rather than one that 
creates meaning. As Lilla notes, the secularization of the West led to greater 
acceptance of diversity and put an end to religious warfare, and, in turn, the 
irrational exuberance created by religious devotion has given way to a calmer, 
more reasonable public realm.3 The rise of reason has helped establish liberal 
values such as impersonal justice and equality before the law.4 Indeed, 
according to Lilla, one of the greatest threats to liberal democracy (as 
manifested in various forms of religious fundamentalism) is the desire to 
connect meaning with law or politics.5 At best, such efforts make political 
                                                     
1 MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND THE MODERN WEST 58 
(2007). 
2 See Mark Lilla, The End of Identity Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-
liberalism.html?_r=0.   
3 LILLA, supra note 1, at 300–01. Lilla goes on to state: 
One of Hobbes’s fundamental insights, which lies at the foundation of the 
liberal-democratic tradition, was that the scope of political thought, and 
therefore political life, could be self-limited by focusing on the problem of 
the passions. For him, politics was a dangerous business, a smoking 
battlefield where the modest goods of life—peace of mind, prosperity, 
simple decency—were constantly under threat by those who sought higher 
goods under divine inspiration and imposed their convictions on others. 
Politics was not about achieving the highest good; it was a problem that 
could be solved only if its proper limits were observed, the passions were 
held in check, and mad dreams of turning men into angels or building 
divine cities remained just that—dreams. 
Id.  
4 Id. at 93. 
5 Id. at 308–09. Lilla states: 
[W]e have chosen to limit our politics to protecting individuals from the 
worst harms they can inflict on one another, to securing fundamental 
liberties and providing for their basic welfare, while leaving their spiritual 
destinies in their own hands. We have wagered that it is wiser to beware 
the forces unleashed by the Bible’s messianic promise than to try 
exploiting them for the public good. We have chosen to keep our politics 
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discourse and legal practice messy; at worst, such attempts produce regimes 
like that of Nazi Germany.6 
As a conceptual matter, it seems unlikely for any political community 
to ensure its ongoing existence without engaging in any discussions of 
meaning. Democracy requires, at a minimum, the participation of its citizens, 
and that participation is typically tethered to some substantive conception of 
“the good” or an identity marker that citizens either bring with them from the 
non-public sphere or which originates in the public sphere itself. The values 
Lilla proclaims are thus mixed; while no doubt commendable, they have 
come at a cost. Bracketing considerations of “the good” and questions of 
meaning from the public realm has contributed to what critics of liberalism 
have called the “naked public square.”7 
I. AN INCOMPLETE SEPARATION?  
Even though Lilla is certainly right to emphasize the Great Separation 
(the separation between law and meaning) in the realm of theory, it is less 
clear that the separation is as thorough as Lilla suggests or that the separation 
has occurred at the level of lived experience. In various respects, liberalism 
                                                     
unilluminated by the light of revelation. If our experiment is to work, we 
must rely on our own lucidity. 
Id. 
6 Id. at 279–84. Perhaps unsurprisingly Lilla has also criticized contemporary identity politics 
in the West, especially in the United States, on the grounds that it gets in the way of finding 
common ground with fellow citizens and instead allows them to focus on the thick, 
substantive, and controversial values that are best left in the private sphere. In his 2016 
election postmortem in the New York Times, Lilla insisted: 
We need a post-identity liberalism, and it should draw from the past 
successes of pre-identity liberalism. Such a liberalism would concentrate 
on widening its base by appealing to Americans as Americans and 
emphasizing the issues that affect a vast majority of them. It would speak 
to the nation as a nation of citizens who are in this together and must help 
one another. As for narrower issues that are highly charged symbolically 
and can drive potential allies away, especially those touching on sexuality 
and religion, such a liberalism would work quietly, sensitively and with a 
proper sense of scale.  
Lilla, supra note 2.  (Given the fact that Lilla’s ONCE AND FUTURE LIBERAL is now out and 
covers many of these issues, I feel like I have to at least acknowledge its existence in some 
way.  Not to do so, I fear, makes me seem like I’m not paying attention.)   
7 See, e.g., RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2nd ed. 1988). 
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and secularism represent both a break from, and a successor to, previous 
worldviews. 
This Article focuses particular attention on Reformation-era 
theologian and jurist John Calvin, considering the richness and complexity of 
Calvin’s conception of the nature and function of law.  More so than most 
thinkers, Calvin offers a detailed account of the law’s aspirational and 
punitive qualities; he explains law’s role in structuring liberty and 
establishing civil order; and he uses law to connect civil and heavenly 
realms.8 While talk of what Calvin called the “heavenly kingdom”9 might 
seem to have little resonance with, or relevance for, twenty-first century 
audiences, we stand to benefit from examining the ways in which the norms 
and practices of contemporary secular societies are simultaneously 
continuous and discontinuous with previous worldviews. We could further 
benefit from considering ways that Calvin’s thought has shaped the 
development of certain contemporary beliefs and practices. In so doing, we 
begin to appreciate that Calvin’s heavenly realm represents other substantive, 
value-laden, thick conceptions of “the good” that vie for recognition in the 
civil realm.   
Paul Kahn has written at length on the continuity between pre-liberal 
and liberal political communities, and he locates this continuity precisely in 
the tension between liberal theory and liberal practice, offering an incisive 
analysis regarding the gap between what liberal theory claims and what 
liberal practice does.10 According to Kahn: 
                                                     
8 See JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION (Henry Beveridge trans., 
Christian Classics Ethereal Library 1845) (1536); accord Jesse Couenhoven, Law and 
Gospel, or the Law of the Gospel? Karl Barth’s Political Theology Compared with Luther 
and Calvin, 30 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 181 (2002); John T. McNeill, The Democratic Element 
in Calvin’s Thought, 18 CHURCH HIST. 153 (1949). 
9 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. IV, ch. 20, § 2. 
10 See PAUL KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 25 (2011).  “If we view politics through the lens of contemporary, liberal 
theory, we will misapprehend the nature of political experience and the meanings that 
citizens realize in and through their political identities. Elements of political experience 
grounded in faith and sacrifice will be ignored.” Id.; see also PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING 
LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE 9 (2nd prtg. 2008) [hereinafter LIBERALISM]. Paul Kahn states the 
following: 
[L]iberalism fails to see the way in which citizens committed to American 
political culture occupy a meaningful world. It fails to see what I will 
describe as the erotic foundations of modern political life. We cannot 
understand the character of the relationship between self and polity 
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Failure to recognize the quasi-religious character of the 
modern nation-state as the context within which liberalism 
operates is the single largest failure of liberal political 
theorists. Reading them, one would never know that the 
modern nation-state has been the site of endless passion and 
of sacrifice for ultimate meanings.  For them, the people 
appear only as a decision-making device—majority rule—in 
a world stripped of ultimate meanings. To the liberal theorists, 
the passion of politics appears always as a dangerous outbreak 
of archaic forms of belief and practice.11 
In what seems to be a direct rebuttal to Lilla,12 Kahn insists that we cannot 
make sense of values like patriotism or practices like sacrifice except through 
something like what Robert Cover (discussed infra) termed a nomos. Kahn 
insists that society cannot make sense of values like patriotism or practices 
like sacrifice except through something termed nomos,13 a term used by 
                                                     
without first understanding love. To understand love, however, we need to 
explore the character of the will in dimensions that are beyond the 
imagination of liberal thought. This linking of will to love, and both to 
meaning, expresses the Christian inheritance of our political tradition. This 
is Christianity not as a source of religious doctrine but as a form of 
understanding of self and community. Much of this study is an effort to 
explore the way in which our political life draws as much upon the 
Christian tradition of love and will as on the Enlightenment tradition of 
reason. Modern American political practices and beliefs have achieved a 
kind of stable synthesis of these two sources. That stability, I will argue in 
the conclusion, is under considerable stress today as the erotic conception 
of the citizen’s body is displaced by a more plastic and disembodied 
conception of a subject who locates the self in a variety of networked 
relationships: economic, information, and communicative. 
Id.   
11 LIBERALISM, supra note 10, at 93.  
12 While this particular quotation is not, in fact, a rebuttal to Lilla, Kahn’s POLITICAL 
THEOLOGY (2011), in many respects, represents an extended refutation of Lilla’s argument 
that contemporary liberal societies have fully broken from their pre-modern roots.  
13 KAHN, supra note 10, at 155. Kahn states: 
There can be no nation of Israel as a community sustaining itself through 
history until families are willing to sacrifice their children for the sake of 
the existence of the state. They do so not because of a promise of their own 
well-being, as in Hobbes’s idea of the social contract, but because they 
have faith that the state holds forth an ultimate meaning. Sacrifice is the 
appearance of the sacred as a historical phenomenon. Its domain is silent 
faith, not reasoned discourse. 
Id. 
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Robert Cover in his analysis.14 If law is simply a tool for maintaining social 
control, it will not arouse feelings of patriotism; if law does not implicate 
questions of meaning, it will not inspire sacrifice. The law’s latent supports 
are doing work for the liberal state, whether or not liberal theory still leaves 
a place for such work.   
 Kahn, who has for many years directed the Orville H. Schell, Jr. 
Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School,15 cites human 
rights discourse as one of the most revealing examples of the gap that 
separates liberal theory and liberal practice, pointing in particular to the limits 
of liberal theory to justify the practice of human rights. Kahn states:   
The development of human rights law is, in substantial part, 
the application of reason to the negative economy of pain. 
That is why human rights law is simultaneously so thin and so 
all-encompassing. Its primary end is the avoidance of pain and 
of that which pain mimics, death itself. In an inverse reflection 
of a politics that has become merely an alternative form of the 
market, the discourse of human rights is too easily stripped of 
the autonomy of political meanings, focusing instead on the 
negative task of preventing pain. . . . The human rights 
movement claims to be a new form of global politics—the 
liberal politics of reason—but at its heart [it] has virtually 
nothing to say. . . . There is no point to political deliberation; 
there is simply the reciprocal identification of pain and a claim 
of right.16   
Absent considerations of meaning, the discourse of human rights rings 
hollow and “has virtually nothing to say,” according to Kahn.17 While 
preventing pain is, of course, an important task, it hardly seems to be a robust 
basis for inspiring commitment to general principles or to particular legal and 
political systems.  
Few legal theorists have appreciated the diverse basis and 
manifestations of law better than Robert Cover. In his well-known article 
Nomos and Narrative, from the Harvard Law Review in 1983, Cover 
                                                     
14 See Cover, infra note 18.  
15 Paul W. Kahn, YALE LAW SCHOOL (May 15, 2017), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/faculty/kahn_updated_cv.pdf. 
16 LIBERALISM, supra note 10, at 135–36 (emphasis added). 
17 Id. As Kahn’s life attests, however, one need not let liberal theory’s inability to account 
fully for liberal practice compromise the sorts of practices often associated with such a 
theory. 
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addressed the law’s role in creating and maintaining a “normative universe,” 
or nomos, as Cover termed it, pointing to the connection between law and 
narrative.18 The opening paragraph of his article states: 
For every constitution there is an epic, for each [D]ecalogue a 
scripture. Once understood in the context of the narratives that 
give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to 
be observed, but a world in which we live. In this normative 
world, law and narrative are inseparably related.19 
Cover goes on to emphasize that it is narrative that connects norms 
and law with aspirations and vision. In doing so, narrative links past, present, 
and future, thereby integrating vision with decisions and actions of the 
present and situating all in the context of a shared history. He states:  
The codes that relate our normative system to our social 
constructions of reality and to our visions of what the world 
might be are narrative. The very imposition of a normative 
force upon a state of affairs, real or imagined, is the act of 
creating narrative. . . . To live in a legal world requires that 
one know not only the precepts, but also their connections to 
possible and plausible states of affairs. It requires that one 
integrate not only the “is” and the “ought,” but the “is,” the 
“ought,” and the “what might be.” Narrative so integrates 
these domains.20 
Narrative, of course, can only develop in the context of a community. Cover 
is able to integrate law and vision because of the distinction he draws between 
“law as meaning” and “law as social control and power.” “[T]here is a radical 
dichotomy between the social organization of law as power and the 
organization of law as meaning.”21 “Law as meaning” is world-creating; 
whereas, “law as social control” is “world-maintaining.”22 Cover neither 
                                                     
18 Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). Cover is 
not alone in emphasizing the connection between law, narrative, and community identity. In 
his contribution to the Blackwell Companion to the Hebrew Bible, Bruce Birch writes that 
in the Old Testament, “lawcodes would not have survived to help shape subsequent 
generations in Israel except that they became part of a story that carried the memory of Israel 
as a covenant people and the law as an expression of that identity shaping relationship 
between God and Israel.” Bruce C. Birch, Old Testament Ethics, in THE BLACKWELL 
COMPANION TO THE HEBREW BIBLE 293, 300 (Leo G. Perdue ed. 2001). 
19 Cover, supra note 18, at 4–5. 
20 Id. at 10. 
21 Id. at 18. 
22 Id. at 13. 
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dismisses nor criticizes “law as social control;” rather, he emphasizes that 
law does not simply maintain a community by enforcing norms; it also creates 
norms and gives meanings to those norms.23 In other words, the public realm 
of “law as social control” is supplemented and complemented by background 
supports and norms.24 Actions only take on meaning when done in reference 
to a norm. Cover states:   
There is a difference between sleeping late on Sunday and 
refusing the sacraments, between having a snack and 
desecrating the fast of Yom Kippur . . . In each case an act 
signifies something new and powerful when we understand 
that the act is in reference to a norm. It is this characteristic of 
certain lawbreaking that gives rise to special claims for civil 
disobedience. But the capacity of law to imbue action with 
significance is not limited to resistance or disobedience. Law 
is a resource in signification that enables us to submit, rejoice, 
struggle, pervert, mock, disgrace, humiliate, or dignify.25 
For Cover, then, law enables a wide range of meanings and emotions to be 
given expression. Law restricts and maintains, but it also creates and enables.   
According to Cover, these different manifestations of law—paideic 
and imperial—are rooted in “two corresponding ideal-typical patterns for 
combining corpus, discourse, and interpersonal commitment to form a 
nomos.”26 The paideic, or world-creating, ideal-typical pattern aims to 
educate citizens into a normative system and involves “a sense of direction 
or growth that is constituted as the individual and his community work out 
the implications of their law.”27 The discourse that emerges from the paiedeic 
                                                     
23 Id. at 12. 
The universalist virtues that we have come to identify with modern 
liberalism, the broad principles of our law, are essentially system-
maintaining “weak” forces. They are virtues that are justified by the need 
to ensure the coexistence of worlds of strong normative meaning. The 
systems of normative life that they maintain are the products of “strong” 
forces: culture-specific designs of particularist meaning. These “strong” 
forces . . . create the normative worlds in which law is predominantly a 
system of meaning rather than an imposition of force. 
Id. 
24 Id. at 8. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 12–13. 
27 Id. at 13. 
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model is “initiatory, celebratory, expressive, and performative, rather than 
critical and analytic.”28 In contrast, the imperial, or world-maintaining, ideal-
typical pattern, involves educating citizens about different values and 
systems, and in this model “norms are universal and enforced by 
institutions.”29 The discourse of this system is “premised upon objectivity,” 
and “[i]interpersonal commitments are weak, premised upon only a 
minimalist obligation to refrain from coercion and violence.”30    
In the contemporary West, particularly as manifested in liberal 
political theory, the law’s imperial elements overshadow law’s paedeic 
elements. Secularized law is chiefly conceived as a tool for maintaining social 
control, not for creating meaning. Law has become increasingly pervasive, 
through its regulative functions, even as it has simultaneously been stripped 
of its normative (world-creating) force. While it is not the primary concern 
of this Article, it is worth noting that it is precisely this perception of 
pervasive regulation combined with denials of national distinctiveness that 
have, in recent years, proved most irksome to populist critics of legal and 
political systems in the West. To survive the populist assault, liberalism’s 
legal and political institutions must do a better job of engaging the particular 
histories and conceptions of the good that have helped create and sustain 
those institutions. 
II. WHY CALVIN? 
Why study Calvin? The formal separation, but ultimate unity, of the 
civil and heavenly spheres, of norm with vision, articulated by Calvin 
allowed him to be both idealistic and realistic about the law’s capacity. Calvin 
the realist (perhaps more so than any prominent theologian) recognized the 
pervasiveness of human sinfulness31 and chastened any legal or political 
system that assumed the perfectibility of humankind. Calvin the idealist, 




31 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. II, ch. 1, § 8. Calvin stated: 
For our nature is not only utterly devoid of goodness, but so prolific in all 
kinds of evil, that it can never be idle. . . . [E]everything which is in man, 
from the intellect to the will, from the soul even to the flesh, is defiled and 
pervaded with this concupiscence; or, to express it more briefly, that the 
whole man is in himself nothing else than concupiscence. 
Id. 
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however, reminds us of the potential for law to educate individuals in God’s 
will and to cultivate virtuous action in the process.32 The development of 
Western legal and political institutions in the modern and contemporary eras 
very likely benefited from Calvin’s recognition of the law’s limits as well as 
its capacities.33 To be sure, however, even as instructive as Calvin might be, 
                                                     
32 Id. at bk. II, ch. 7, § 12. Calvin further stated: 
For [law] is the best instrument for enabling [believers] daily to learn with 
greater truth and certainty what that will of the Lord is which they aspire 
to follow, and to confirm them in this knowledge; just as a servant who 
desires with all his soul to approve himself to his master, must still observe, 
and be careful to ascertain his master’s dispositions, that he may comport 
himself in accommodation to them. Let none of us deem ourselves exempt 
from this necessity, for none have as yet attained to such a degree of 
wisdom, as that they may not, by the daily instruction of the Law, advance 
to a purer knowledge of the Divine will. Then, because we need not 
doctrine merely, but exhortation also, the servant of God will derive this 
further advantage from the Law: by frequently meditating upon it, he will 
be excited to obedience, and confirmed in it, and so drawn away from the 
slippery paths of sin. 
Id. 
33 See, e.g., Sheldon S. Wolin, Calvin and the Reformation: The Political Education of 
Protestantism, 51 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 428, 429, 434 (1957). Wolin summarizes a statement 
made by Calvin: 
The individual was to be reintegrated into a double order, religious and 
political, and the orders themselves were to be linked in a common unity. 
The discontinuity between religious obligations and restraints and their 
political counterparts was to be repaired; Christian virtue and political 
virtue were to move closer together. The order that emerged was not a 
“theocracy,” but a corporate community that was neither purely religious 
nor purely secular, but a compound of both.  
Id. Wolin continues: 
Calvin’s distinction between the two powers was intended to preserve the 
power of each and to refute the notion that spiritual power was merely a 
form of insubstantial persuasion. Moreover, when Calvin defined the 
spiritual government as the means whereby “the conscience is formed to 
piety and the service of God” and the civil government as that order which 
“instructs in the duties of humanity and civility,” he did not mean that the 
spiritual government alone was concerned with conscience while the 
political government alone regulated “external” conduct. . . . [T]he civil 
government was concerned with conscience, but of a different kind. It had 
a positive duty to promote and shape a “civic conscience,” or what the 
ancients had called “civic virtue.” Conversely, the spiritual government, in 
discharging its functions of preaching and instruction, was also expected 
to help form civil manners, to correct “incivility,” in short, to influence 
“external” conduct. 
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there are limits to what contemporary theorists can draw from his work given 
the vastly different context between his time and our own. Calvin’s relevance 
(as well as his limitations) are discussed in the pages that follow.  
Calvin was trained in the law,34 and from his first published writings 
on Seneca’s De Clementia until his death, Calvin expressed a deep interest in 
and respect for law and civil government.35 This Article considers the 
richness and complexity of Calvin’s conception of the law, paying particular 
attention to the law’s relationship to the civil realm. More so than most 
thinkers, Calvin offers a detailed account of the law’s aspirational and 
punitive qualities;36 he explains the law’s role in structuring liberty and 
establishing civil order;37 and he reveals the close relationship between civil 
and heavenly realms through his discussions of the law.38 
This Article examines Calvin’s three-part division of the uses of the 
law, considering in particular the differences between Calvin’s 
schematization compared to that of Seneca and Luther. It then looks at the 
law’s role in structuring liberty and in establishing civil government. It 
further explores the relationship between revelation and natural law before 
concluding that Calvin’s civil and heavenly realms are even more closely 
related than Calvin acknowledges. Finally, it considers the distinctiveness of 
Calvin’s view of the law and then assesses the status of Calvin’s legacy in 
law and politics in the modern and contemporary Western world. 
Like Calvin, this Article takes a broad view of the law. In general, law 
is a synecdoche for the civil realm. Looking at Calvin’s handling of the law 
reveals the connections (indeed, the underlying unity) between civil and 
heavenly realms. If there is anything that the contemporary world should 
                                                     
Id. at 434.  
34 See, e.g., Bruce Gordon, CALVIN 18–22 (Yale U. Press ed, 2009). 
35 John T. McNeil, John Calvin on Civil Government, 42 J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST. 71, 72 
(1964). John McNeill has shown the pervasiveness and depth of Calvin’s interest in law and 
civil government. In John Calvin on Civil Government, McNeill outlines the many contexts 
in which Calvin indicated his interest in law and civil government: his correspondence, his 
commentaries, and in the institutes. Id. Concerning the depth of Calvin’s commitment, 
McNeil writes, “Few theologians have shown an equally positive attitude to government or 
a similar attention to political affairs.  [Calvin] asserts a divine sanction of the state, 
inculcates a positive attitude to politics and law, and persistently urges the principle of 
obedience to rulers.” John T. McNeill, The Democratic Element in Calvin’s Thought, 18 
CHURCH HIST. 153, 155 (1949) [hereinafter Democratic].  
36 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. II, ch. 7, § 12. 
37 Id. at bk. IV, ch. 20, § 3. 
38 Id. at bk. IV, ch. 20, § 2. 
48 A COMMON ENTERPRISE Vol. 4 
 
draw from Calvin’s writing on the law, it is that the law is a richer resource 
than is often realized. At its best it performs multiple functions. The law can 
both limit and enable; it can punish but also educate.   
In The Three Uses of the Law, John Witte and Thomas Arthur trace 
the parallels between Protestant and secular uses of the law.39 They argue that 
modern secular understandings of the uses of law (retributivism, deterrence, 
and rehabilitation) are simply the heirs of sixteenth century doctrines 
regarding the three uses of the law: theological, civil, and educational.40 Law 
was designed, as Witte and Arthur note, to “coerce, discipline, and nurture . 
. . .”41 In Calvin’s world, the difference between criminal and sinful activity 
was minimal.42 Thus, as a result, justice and mercy were complementary 
values.  
Furthermore, according to Witte and Arthur, following the example 
of the Reformers, early modern secular “jurists subsumed and integrated their 
‘uses’ doctrine in a more general theory.”43 They further state: 
[T]heologians subsumed their uses doctrine in a more general 
theology of salvation. For them, the moral law played an 
indispensable role in the process from predestination to 
justification to sanctification. The jurists subsumed their uses 
doctrine in a moral theory of government. For them, the 
criminal law played an indispensable role in discharging the 
divinely ordained tasks of the state to coerce, discipline, and 
nurture its citizens.44 
Early modern Reformed theology and criminal law both assumed a unity 
between particular uses of law and general theories of “the good.” Law, in 
other words, was an important locus that gave content to the Christian 
community’s vision of the good life. 
                                                     
39 See John E. Witte, Jr. & Thomas C. Arthur, The Three Uses of the Law: A Protestant 
Source of the Purposes of Criminal Punishment?, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 433 (1993). 
40 See id. Witte and Arthur likely paint with too broad of brush strokes when they speak of 
“Protestant” uses of the law. There were significant differences between Calvin and Luther 
concerning the unity of law and gospel and the uses of the law. Even if too general at points, 
Witte and Arthur raise interesting and relevant arguments. 
41 Id. at 458. 
42 Id. at 433. In their piece, which focuses on Luther and Calvin, Witte and Arthur claim, 
“[l]aw and religion are conceptually related. They embrace closely analogous concepts of 
sin and crime . . . .” Id. 
43 Id. at 458. 
44 Id. 
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It does not take much effort to connect what Witte and Arthur describe 
as a “general theology of salvation” and the “moral theory of government.”45 
Liberal citizenship entails a process similar to salvation. Predestination 
represents our being born into a particular political community; justification 
represents citizens’ free and equal status before the law; and sanctification 
represents the cultivation of virtues of citizenship. Accepting a secular 
analogue of predestination would compromise the cosmopolitan and 
universal aims of contemporary liberal political theory and would inevitably 
implicate questions of history in which liberal theory would prefer not to 
engage. Talk of secular sanctification would necessarily involve leaving the 
domain of the right to engage controversial conceptions of the good.46   
III. DUTY AND ASPIRATION: THREE USES OF THE LAW 
Calvin outlined three uses of the moral law in his work, INSTITUTES 
OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. In this section, this Article first considers 
Calvin’s three-part classification before turning to Seneca and Luther’s views 
of the law.47 Calvin describes the three uses of the law in Book II of the 
INSTITUTES. : “First, by exhibiting the righteousness of God . . . it [the law] 
admonishes every one of his own unrighteousness, certiorates, convicts, and 
finally condemns him.”48  This first pedagogical use of “the Law is a kind of 
mirror. As in a mirror we discover any stains upon our face, so in the Law we 
behold, first, our impotence; then, in consequence of it, our iniquity; and, 
finally, the curse, as the consequence of both.”49   
According to Calvin, “[t]he second office of the Law is, by means of 
its fearful denunciations and the consequent dread of punishment, to curb 
those who, unless forced, have no regard for rectitude and justice.”50 As 
                                                     
45 Id. 
46 See, e.g., John Rawls, Lecture V: The Priority of Right and the Ideas of Good, in POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 67 (Expanded ed. 2005). A liberal state, according to Rawls, is designed to 
implement fair procedures of justice; it is not designed to promote any particular conception 
of the good. Id. If a law’s justifications arise from reasons contingent upon a particular 
conception of the good, then the resulting law will lack legitimacy for anyone who does not 
share the same conception of the good. Id. Different conceptions of the good should be 
accepted, and perhaps even celebrated, but they should remain in the private sphere. Id. 
47 This Article borrows the insight that Calvin’s three uses of the moral law produce two 
types of morality—duty and aspiration. See generally JOHN WITTE, JR., THE REFORMATION 
OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM (2007). 
48 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. II, ch. 7, § 6. 
49 Id. at bk. II, ch. 7, § 7. 
50 Id. at bk. II, ch. 7, § 10. 
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Calvin makes clear, this second use of the law aims to improve the behavior 
of individual people and to benefit all of society in the process. “[T]his forced 
and extorted righteousness is necessary for the good of society, its peace 
being secured by a provision but for which all things would be thrown into 
tumult and confusion.”51 This second use of the law acts as a “restraint on 
unruly lusts that would otherwise burst all bonds” and applies to Christians 
as well as to those “destitute of the Spirit of holiness. . . . ”52   
Finally, “[t]he third use of the Law (being also the principal use, and 
more closely connected with its proper end) has respect to believers in whose 
hearts the Spirit of God already flourishes and reigns.”53 This third use of the 
law allows Christians “daily to learn with greater truth and certainty what that 
will of the Lord is which they aspire to follow, and to confirm them in this 
knowledge . . . .”54 Calvin continues,  “[J]ust as a servant who desires with 
all his soul to approve himself to his master, must still observe, and be careful 
to ascertain his master’s dispositions, that he may comport himself in 
accommodation to them.”55 In sum, the third use of the law is designed to 
bring about a change in what the individual desires: the individual’s desires 
become conformed to God’s desires. 
While Calvin’s three-part division was not novel, his particular 
emphases reveal differences between himself and the thinkers that potentially 
influenced him. Seneca, the focus of Calvin’s first published work, also 
outlined three uses of the law: 
Let us, pass now to the injuries done to others, in the 
punishment of which these three aims, which the law has had 
in view, should be kept in view also by the prince: either to 
reform the man that is punished, or by punishing him to make 
the rest better, or by removing bad men to let the rest live in 
greater security.56 
In his discussion of Seneca’s three-part division of law in the COMMENTARY 
ON SENECA’S DE CLEMENTIA, Calvin primarily focuses on showing that 
Seneca’s three uses of the law were consistent with much of ancient Greek 
                                                     
51 Id. at bk. II, ch. 7, § 10. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at bk. II, ch. 7, § 12. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 1 LUCIUS ANNASUS SENECA, On Mercy, in MORAL ESSAYS 357, 419 (John W. Basore 
trans., 1928). 
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and Roman thinking.57 Calvin reveals his knowledge of classical sources, but 
he does not indicate whether or not he actually approves of Seneca’s 
classification.58 Ford Lewis Battles claimed that “Calvin was later to adapt 
this three-fold scheme to his own uses of the law . . . and to the triple use of 
church discipline.”59 While Battles is right to point to the parallels between 
Seneca’s three uses of the law and Calvin’s three uses of church discipline, 
Irena Backus likely has the better argument when she observes that the only 
similarities between Calvin’s and Seneca’s three uses of civil law are 
“superficial” and “structural.”60 Backus rightly notes that Seneca’s civil law 
functions as “animaduersio, exemplum, and protection of society . . . .”61 This 
contrasts with Calvin’s more aspirational adaptation, which involves 
“revealing God’s justice, coercing Christians into good behavior, and 
improving their knowledge of God.”62   
For Calvin, law does not simply warn, punish, and protect. It ought 
also to lead to right knowledge and genuine understanding regarding the 
connection between what one does and what one ought to do—between what 
one desires and what one ought to desire.63 Seneca’s three uses of the law are 
                                                     
57 JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARY ON SENECA’S DE CLEMENTIA 206–07 (Ages Software 1998) 
(1532). 
58 Id. 
59 CALVIN’S COMMENTARIES ON SENECA’S DE CLEMENTIA at 137 (Ford Lewis Battles and 
Andre Malan Hugo, eds. 1969). 
60 Irena Backus, Calvin’s Concept of Natural and Roman Law, 38 CALVIN THEOLOGICAL J. 
7, 21 (2003). 
61 Id. at 21. 
62 Id.  
63 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. II, ch. 7, § 12. Calvin states:  
 For [law] is the best instrument for enabling [believers] daily to learn with 
greater truth and certainty what that will of the Lord is which they aspire 
to follow, and to confirm them in this knowledge; just as a servant who 
desires with all his soul to approve himself to his master, must still observe, 
and be careful to ascertain his master’s dispositions, that he may comport 
himself in accommodation to them. Let none of us deem ourselves exempt 
from this necessity, for none have as yet attained to such a degree of 
wisdom, as that they may not, by the daily instruction of the Law, advance 
to a purer knowledge of the Divine will. Then, because we need not 
doctrine merely, but exhortation also, the servant of God will derive this 
further advantage from the Law: by frequently meditating upon it, he will 
be excited to obedience, and confirmed in it, and so drawn away from the 
slippery paths of sin. 
Id. 
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also more self-consciously concerned with punishment than Calvin’s.64 
Calvin is certainly concerned with the law’s role in punishing those who harm 
others, but his first and third uses of the law deal with education as much as 
with punishment. Battles is therefore likely too quick to assume that Calvin 
relied directly on Seneca’s three-part division.   
Consider Luther also. At first blush, the three Lutheran uses of the 
law closely resemble Calvin’s division. The Lutheran Formula of Concord 
states: 
[F]irst, that thereby outward discipline might be maintained 
against wild, disobedient men [and that wild and intractable 
men might be restrained, as though by certain bars]; secondly, 
that men thereby may be led to the knowledge of their sins; 
thirdly, that after they are regenerate . . . they might . . . have 
a fixed rule according to which they are to regulate and direct 
their whole life . . . .65 
Except for inverting the first and second uses of the law, Calvin’s 
classification appears very much in line with the Lutheran Formula of 
Concord. This different ordering is not insignificant. Calvin suggests that law 
begins and ends with understanding, not punishment, by first beginning with 
the theological and pedagogical use of the law, and then by finishing with the 
guiding features of the law. The civil use of the law is, for Calvin, faced on 
either side by its pedagogical and aspirational use. 
Furthermore, there is some doubt as to whether Luther himself even 
accepted a third use of the law, or if it was simply added by later followers, 
especially Philipp Melanchton. William Lazareth has summarized these 
doubts: 
Luther explicitly summarized his support for only “two uses” 
of the Law, civilly and theologically, in both his magisterial 
Lectures on Galatians (1535) and his “theological last will and 
testament” the Smalcald Articles (1537). . . . 
 The international scholarly consensus on Luther and 
the Law was summarized in 1965 by Wilhelm Maurer. In 
contrasting Luther’s approach with the title and parts of the 
later Formula of Concord (1577), Maurer judged: “In Article 
VI, however, the Gospel is actually subordinated to the 
                                                     
64 See SENECA, supra note 56, for discussion of Seneca’s three uses of the law.  
65 Formula of Concord, Epitome VI.1, in TRIGLOT CONCORDIA: THE SYMBOLICAL BOOKS OF 
THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH: GERMAN-LATIN-ENGLISH 14 (1921). 
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Law….Recent Luther research has adduced the evidence that 
the doctrine of the third use is foreign to Luther; nor is it set 
forth In the Augsburg Confession [1530] or the Apology 
[1531].” . . .  
 Then at the end of the twentieth century, this 
preponderant academic viewpoint was once again 
corroborated by Karl-Heintz zur Mühlen as follows: “This 
understanding of the distinction between Law and Gospel led 
Luther to the doctrine of the duplex usus legis (the twofold use 
of the Law),” the civil use to promote temporal peace and 
justice, the theological use to accuse and torment spiritual sin 
and unrighteousness.66 
It is not this Article’s intention to argue that Luther refused to recognize the 
third use of the law. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that the 
inclusion of the third use of the law in the Formula of Concord suggests that 
(regardless of Luther’s ideas or intentions) subsequent Lutherans have largely 
accepted the third use of the law. In any event, the uncertainty surrounding 
Luther’s sentiments regarding the third use of the law reveals that Luther was 
not as enthusiastic about the doctrine as to Calvin.67 
Luther’s lower valuation of the third use of the law should not be 
surprising. Luther generally had lower esteem for law than Calvin.68 The law, 
according to Luther, structured a secular realm that was quite distinct from 
the spiritual realm.69 Law applied to the civil realm, gospel to the spiritual 
realm.70 As Jesse Couenhoven notes, Luther’s sharp distinction between law 
and gospel 
                                                     
66 William Lazareth, Antinomians: Then and Now, 5 J. LUTHERAN ETHICS 1, 18–19 (2002). 
67 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. II, ch. 7, § 12 (“The third use of the Law (being also the 
principal use, and more closely connected with its proper end) has respect to believers in 
whose hearts the Spirit of God already flourishes and reigns.”). 
68 Jesse Couenhoven, Law and Gospel, or the Law of the Gospel? Karl Barth’s Political 
Theory Compared with Luther and Calvin, 30 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 181, 182–86 (2002).  
69 Martin Luther, TEMPORAL AUTHORITY: TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE OBEYED (1523), 
reprinted in LUTHER: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS 51, 55–56 (J.M. Porter ed., 2003) 
(“God has ordained two governments: the spiritual, by which the Holy Spirit produces 
Christians and righteous people under Christ; and the temporal, which restrains the un-
Christian and wicked so that—no thanks to them—they are obliged to keep still and to 
maintain an outward peace.”) And further, “[O]ne must carefully distinguish between these 
two governments.  Both must be permitted to remain; the one to produce righteousness, the 
other to bring about external peace and prevent evil deeds.” Id. at 56–57. 
70 Id. at 60–62. 
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[H]as the tendency to result in a dualism between a worldly 
state and the Christ-based church, as well as a split in the lives 
of individual believers, who live in both spheres but find it 
hard to unite them. Since the law, as Luther usually 
understands it, contains nothing positive, it does not point the 
state towards the fullness of life found in the gospel. The state 
has to do with justice and human reason, not a revelation of 
perfect love. 71 
Calvin’s vision of law, including the relationship between law and 
gospel, is quite distinct from Luther’s. According to Calvin, law applies to 
and bridges both realms. Law convicts, punishes, and nurtures. The first, 
theological use of the law convicts us of our sin;72 the second, civil use of the 
law punishes that sin.73 It is the third use, however, that connects the 
theological and the civil uses.74 The third, aspirational, use of the law, in 
Couenhoven’s words, “point[s] the state towards the fullness of life found in 
the gospel.”75  
IV. LAW, LIBERTY, AND GOVERNMENT 
Calvin had an abiding interest in law and government.76 And law’s 
reach, according to Calvin, is thoroughgoing, applying not merely in outward 
decency but in inward spiritual righteousness.77 It structures liberty and 
makes order possible in general, as well as the government in particular.78 
This section examines the relationship between law, liberty, and government 
in Calvin’s work.  
                                                     
71 Couenhoven, supra note 68, at 184. 
72 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. II, ch. 7, § 6. 
73 See generally id. at bk. II, ch. 7, § 10. 
74 See generally id. at bk. II, ch. 7, § 12, 14. The law’s third use connects the theological and 
civil uses by helping to conform action to belief. 
75 Couenhoven, supra note 68, at 184. 
76 John Calvin on Civil Government, in CALVINISM AND POLITICAL ORDER 23–24 (George 
L. Hunt & John T. McNeil eds., 1965). Commenting on Calvin’s writings: 
It need not surprise us to find that from his Commentary on Seneca’s 
Treatise on Clemency of 1532 until that hour in 1564 when from his 
deathbed he urged the magistrates of Geneva so to rule as to “preserve this 
republic in its happy condition,” his writings are strewn with penetrating 
comments on the policies of rulers and illuminating passages on the 
principles of government. 
Id. 
77 See generally CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. II, ch. 8, § 6. 
78 See generally id. 
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In the parlance of contemporary political theory, Calvin conceived of 
liberty in positive rather than negative terms.79 Freedom for Calvin was not 
found simply by removing constraints.80  True freedom was directed towards 
particular ends and involved connecting the empirical self with what one, 
objectively, ought to want (i.e., God’s will).81 This sort of freedom required 
the active cultivation of particular virtues and values, but these would not 
arise ex nihilo given the reality of human sinfulness. Order, restraint, and 
moderation were conditions as well as products of true freedom.82   
Since law is not simply a mechanism for punishment, but also a 
device for moral improvement,83 it plays an invaluable role in revealing to 
humans what they ought to desire. Sin taints the will and the reason of the 
empirical self so badly that individuals without God’s help will inevitably be 
confused about what will truly make them free.84 The law not only convicts 
and punishes, but it also helps people conform themselves to what God wants. 
It is only through emptying one’s self of the desires of the flesh and 
embracing God’s will that freedom can be found.85   
Unrestrained freedom might seem appealing on its face, but it 
presents numerous dangers.  Without this structured liberty humans would be 
no better than animals: 
                                                     
79 Isaiah Berlin is typically credited with making famous this positive liberty/negative liberty 
schematization. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166, 177–78 (Henry 
Hardy ed., 2nd ed. 2002).  
80 Hobbes is likely the most well-known proponent of conceiving liberty in negative terms, 
i.e., as the absence of constraint. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 107–10 (J. C. A. Gaskin, 
ed., Oxford University Press 1996).  
81 Calvin provides outlines of the components of Christian liberty: (1) “the conscience of 
believers”; (2) “that consciences obey law, not as if compelled by legal necessity; but being 
free from the yoke of the law itself, voluntarily obey the will of God”; and (3) “that we are 
not bound before God to any observance of external things which are in themselves 
indifferent (adiaphora) but that we are now at full liberty either to use or omit them.” CALVIN, 
supra note 8, at bk. III, ch. 19, § 2–7.  
82 Id. at bk. IV, ch. 20, § 8 (“And as I willingly admit that there is no kind of government 
happier than where liberty is framed with becoming moderation, and duly constituted so as 
to be durable.”). 
83 See supra Section III. 
84 See generally CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. II, ch. 4, § 1. 
85 See id. at bk. II, ch. 5 (arguing that freedom looks very little like contemporary conceptions 
of the principle). Calvin refutes the very idea of free will by which he means unconstrained, 
undirected human agency. See id. Humans are either under the control of sin or of God, and 
by being under God’s control enables true freedom to develop. See id. 
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It would, indeed, be better for us to be wild beasts, and to 
wander in the forests, than to live without government and 
laws; for we know how furious are the passions of men.  
Unless, therefore, there be some restraint, the condition of 
wild beasts would be better and more desirable than ours.  
Liberty, then, would ever bring ruin with it, were it not bridled 
and connected with regular government.86   
Indeed, without laws, life would be much like the lawless and “nasty, brutish, 
and short”87 state of nature that Thomas Hobbes would famously describe 
one hundred years later.  As Calvin writes, “all would end in prey and 
plunder, and in the mere license of fraud and murder, and all the passions of 
mankind would have full and unbridled sway.”88   
John McNeill has rightly suggested that Calvin’s concerns about 
disorder animate his skepticism about resistance to political authority.89 After 
citing numerous positive references to liberty in Calvin’s works, McNeil 
concludes “[t]here is no doubt about Calvin’s espousal of liberty; but it is 
always a liberty limited by law and duty, and is never interpreted in 
revolutionary terms.”90 Similarly, Derek Jeffreys has noted that Calvin’s high 
valuation of order meant he even preferred tyranny to anarchy, if forced to 
choose.91 Clear support for this position can be found in Calvin’s 
                                                     
86 JOHN CALVIN, CALVIN’S BIBLE COMMENTARIES: JEREMIAH AND LAMENTATIONS, 8 
(Forgotten Books, Part IV, 2007). 
87 Hobbes, supra note 80, at 97. 
88 1 JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARIES ON THE BOOK OF THE PROPHET DANIEL 256 (Baker Book 
House, Volume First, 2005) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON DANIEL]. 
89 Democratic, supra note 35, at 166. McNeill argues: 
It is not Calvin’s subjection of the ruler to God that makes him cautious on 
the side of democracy.  It is rather his fear of disorderly excesses. . . . 
Calvin's letters show a good deal of adjustment of his advice to conditions. 
But in general he stood firmly on the ground that liberty should not be 
permitted to subvert an established public order. The principle of order is 
divine: it was imparted to man at creation and is possessed in common by 
mankind. If it were otherwise, government and society would be 
impossible. Thus Calvin forbids the individual to resist oppression and lays 
the task of such resistance upon the constituted magistracy. 
Id. 
90 Id. at 166–67. 
91 Derek Jeffreys, “It's a Miracle of God That There Is Any Common Weal among Us”: 
Unfaithfulness and Disorder in John Calvin's Political Thought, 62 REV. POLITICS 107, 125 
(2000). Paraphrasing Calvin’s disdain for disorder, Jeffreys writes: 
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Commentary on Daniel. “[I]t is better to live under the most cruel tyrant than 
without any government at all. . . . [T]yranny is better than anarchy . . . 
because where there is no supreme governor there is none to preside and keep 
the rest in check.”92 The practical benefits of civil government are many: 
[I]n every human society some kind of government is 
necessary to insure the common peace and maintain concord . 
. . . But seeing there is such diversity in the manners of men, 
such variety in their minds, such repugnance in their 
judgments and dispositions, no policy is sufficiently firm 
unless fortified by certain laws . . . . So far, therefore, are we 
from condemning the laws which conduce to this, that we hold 
that the removal of them would unnerve the Church, deface 
and dissipate it entirely.93   
Laws provide uniformity amidst diversity of minds, manners, and judgments 
and also secure the sort of stability needed by the political community and 
the church. Furthermore, the ends and benefits of civil government pertain to 
both material and spiritual goods.94  The “state originates as a device to 
restrain sinners,” but the function of the state and its laws ultimately reach 
well beyond such negative functions.95 Calvin details the material and 
spiritual ends of the state’s laws: 
[I]t is perfect barbarism to think of exterminating [civil 
government], its use among men being not less than that of 
bread and water, light and air, while its dignity is much more 
excellent. Its object is not merely, like those things, to enable 
men to breathe, eat, drink, and be warmed (though it certainly 
includes all these, while it enables them to live together); this, 
I say, is not its only object, but it is, that no idolatry, no 
blasphemy against the name of God, no calumnies against his 
                                                     
Facing [extreme disorder], most human beings will choose tyranny over 
anarchy. No matter how bad tyranny is, a minimal goodness remains in the 
institution of government (Daniel 4:10-16). In fact, even tyranny supports 
social life to some extent (Romans 13:3). However, we cannot say the 
same about anarchy; without government, human beings “hardly differ 
from beasts” (Isaiah 34:12). 
 
Id. 
92 COMMENTARIES ON DANIEL, supra note 88, at 216. 
93 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. IV, ch. 10, § 27. 
94 Id. at bk. IV, ch. 20, § 2–3. 
95 Democratic, supra note 35, at 156. 
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truth, nor other offenses to religion, break out and be 
disseminated among the people; that the public quiet be not 
disturbed, that every man’s property be kept secure, that men 
may carry on innocent commerce with each other, that honesty 
and modesty be cultivated; in short, that a public form of 
religion may exist among Christians . . . .96   
It is clear, then, that Calvin looked to the law to perform a variety of 
tasks. Calvin understood better than some of the other early Reformers that 
law and civil government had noble functions. Chief among the 
responsibilities of the civil realm was to guard against disorder and to protect 
property, but the civil realm, as noted in the above excerpt, was also supposed 
to prevent spiritual ills. Calvin understood that order was both practically 
useful and morally necessary.97 To recognize the moral value of order, it is 
important to recall Calvin’s high valuation of law. Contrasting Calvin’s views 
with those of Luther, Sheldon Wolin has insightfully noted: 
[Luther’s] government aimed not at virtue, but at keeping men 
from each other’s throats; mankind had never really given up 
the Hobbesian state of nature. In this view, an extreme tension 
persisted between the nature of man and the requirements of 
order. . . . Yet it is a picture with a striking incongruity 
between the Christian cosmology and the Christian sociology, 
the one positing an omnipotent God ordering all of creation 
towards harmony, the other painting society as a dark, 
disordered mass trembling on the brink of anarchy and 
seemingly outside the beneficent order of God. . . . The task 
Calvin undertook was. . . . to resolve the conflict between the 
Christian cosmology and its sociology; he had to re-establish 
the moral status of the political order, but without making it 
appear as a substitute for religious society . . . . The over-all 
method Calvin employed for bringing the two societies into 
some kind of congruence was to treat them both as subject to 
the general principle of order.98   
Law, liberty, order, civil government, and religious virtue were all intimately 
connected. Law structures liberty and makes possible the order of civil 
government. Civil government, in turn, produces material as well as spiritual 
                                                     
96 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. IV, ch. 20, § 3. 
97Id. at bk. IV, ch. 20, § 3. 
98 SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION 161–62 (Princeton Univ. Press, Expanded 
Edition, 2004). 
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benefits. In the following section, this Article continues exploring the close 
relationship between civil and heavenly realms. 
V. REVELATION, NATURAL LAW, AND THE UNITY OF CIVIL AND 
HEAVENLY REALMS 
Although Calvin maintained a formal distinction between civil and 
spiritual realms,99 the two ultimately were united in their common ends (i.e., 
nurturing people toward righteousness). This section looks at the contested 
place of natural law in Calvin’s theology as an entry point for assessing the 
ultimate unity between civil and heavenly realms.100   
The compatibility of Calvin’s theology with natural law is a 
longstanding matter of dispute.101 Some have argued that natural law serves 
little purpose in Calvin’s work given Calvin’s high valuation of Scripture and 
his rather pessimistic view of what humans can accomplish without the direct 
aid of God’s revelation.102 Others, however, have insisted that natural law 
plays an essential role in Calvin’s thought.103  
One seemingly reasonable solution to the conflicting views 
concerning Calvin’s use of natural law is to propose a robust distinction 
between Calvin’s two kingdoms. David Vandrunen has argued that Calvin 
both accepted and rejected natural law. Calvin embraced natural law 
reasoning in the civil sphere but rejected it in the spiritual realm.104 
                                                     
99 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. II, ch. 2, § 13 (“[W]e have one kind of intelligence of earthly 
things, and another of heavenly things.”). 
100 It is not the purpose of this Section to resolve this debate, or even to outline its parameters 
in full detail, but rather to acknowledge the tension and to consider what the debate suggests 
regarding the relationship between civil and heavenly realms. 
101See supra notes 2–4; see also 20 GUENTHER H. HAAS, THE CONCEPT OF EQUITY IN 
CALVIN’S ETHICS (1997); I. JOHN HESSELINK, CALVIN’S CONCEPT OF THE LAW (1992); 
William Klempa, John Calvin on Natural Law, in JOHN CALVIN AND THE CHURCH: A PRISM 
OF REFORM 72 (Timothy George ed., 1990); SUSAN E. SCHREINER, THE THEATER OF HIS 
GLORY: NATURE & THE NATURAL ORDER IN THE THOUGHT OF JOHN CALVIN (2001); David 
Vandrunen, The Context of Natural Law: John Calvin’s Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, 46 
J. CHURCH AND ST. 503, 505 (2004). 
102 See generally Karl Barth, No!, in NATURAL THEOLOGY (Peter Fraenkel trans., 2002) 
(1934); August Lang, The Reformation and Natural Law, in CALVIN AND THE REFORMATION 
(William P. Armstrong ed., Wipf and Stock Publishers 2004) (1909); and MICHAEL WALZER, 
THE REVOLUTION OF THE SAINTS: A STUDY IN THE ORIGINS OF RADICAL POLITICS (1965). 
103 See generally Susan E. Schreiner, Calvin’s Use of Natural Law, in A PRESERVING GRACE: 
PROTESTANTS, CATHOLICS, AND NATURAL LAW, 54, 55, 73 (Michael Cromartie ed., 1997). 
John T. McNeill, Natural Law in The Teaching of the Reformers, 26 J. RELIGION 168 (1946). 
104 Vandrunen, supra note 101, at 521. This argument has both logical appeal and textual 
support from the Institutes. See also CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. II, ch. 2, § 13. 
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Vandrunen argues that natural law reasoning performs important functions, 
even though reason itself is tainted by human imperfection: 
For Calvin, the sinful human person, by use of reason and 
natural knowledge, can attain to great things in the domain of 
earthly things, that is, of the civil kingdom. By use of reason 
and natural knowledge, however, the sinful person cannot 
even begin to make the slightest approach to knowledge of 
God’s being or salvation, that is, of the heavenly kingdom of 
Christ. Natural law, therefore, has a positive function to play 
in the life of the earthly, civil kingdom, according to Calvin. . 
. . He denied that natural law could ever give knowledge of 
salvation in the heavenly kingdom, even while he affirmed 
that it provided true and useful knowledge of mundane 
things in the civil kingdom.105 
If this is all Vandrunen argued, one might be inclined to accept his 
effort to solve the tension. However, Vandrunen’s argument goes a bit 
further. He not only argues that natural law is inapplicable to the spiritual 
realm, but he also claims that Calvin offered an “explicit identification of 
natural law as the standard for civil law.”106 Vandrunen correctly notes that 
these passages from Book II of the INSTITUTES suggest (a) a clear distinction 
between civil and spiritual realms and (b) the applicability of natural law 
reasoning to the civil realm.  Calvin writes: 
[W]e have one kind of intelligence of earthly things, and 
another of heavenly things.  By earthly things, I mean those 
which relate not to God and his kingdom, to true righteousness 
and future blessedness, but have some connection with the 
present life, and are in a manner confined within its 
boundaries.107 
Vandrunen’s thesis helps answer one question about the role of natural law 
in Calvin’s thought, but, in so doing, he creates another problem. Vandrunen 
runs the risk of putting the civil and spiritual realms in tension with each 
other, if not in outright conflict. By emphasizing the distinction between 
Calvin’s two kingdoms, Vandrunen overlooks the complementary role that 
civil and spiritual realms play in Calvin’s thought and also neglects some of 
                                                     
105 Vandrunen, supra note 101, at 521. 
106 Id. To be fair, Vandrunen acknowledges in passing at the end of his piece that Calvin “did 
not think Scripture irrelevant for civil law.” Id.at 523. 
107 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. II, ch. 2, § 13. 
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what distinguishes Calvin from earlier Reformers like Luther. Vandrunen 
makes this mistake, in part, by largely overlooking Book IV of the 
INSTITUTES. According to Backus, there is a clear tension between Book II of 
the Institutes and Book IV.108 Book II gestures towards the autonomy of the 
civil realm; Book IV discusses the connections between the civil and 
heavenly realms.109  
In Book IV, Calvin makes clear that the civil and spiritual realms, 
although formally distinct, are not completely separate. Contrary to 
appearances, according to Calvin, the civil and spiritual realms are connected: 
Having shown above that there is a twofold government in 
man, and having fully considered the one which, placed in the 
soul or inward man, relates to eternal life, we are here called 
to say something of the other, which pertains only to civil 
institutions and the external regulation of manners.  For 
although the subject seems from its nature to be unconnected 
with the spiritual doctrine of faith, which I have undertaken to 
treat, it will appear as we proceed that I have properly 
connected them.110  
More importantly, the two spheres are not simply connected, but they 
also serve to advance the ends of the other. In perhaps his clearest statement 
of the interdependent relationship, Calvin writes:  
 
[Civil] government is distinct from the spiritual and internal 
kingdom of Christ, so we ought to know that they are not 
adverse to each other. The former, in some measure, begins 
the heavenly kingdom in us, even now upon earth, and in this 
mortal evanescent life commences immortal and incorruptible 
blessedness, while to the latter it is assigned, so long as we 
live among men, to foster and maintain the external worship 
of God, to defend sound doctrine and the condition of the 
Church, to adapt our conduct to human society, to form our 
manners to civil justice, to conciliate us to each other, to 
cherish common peace and tranquility.111   
 
                                                     
108 Backus, supra note 60, at 19 (emphasizing the “connection among human, natural, and 
divine law”). 
109 Id. 
110 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. IV, ch. 20, § 1. 
111 Id. at bk. IV, ch. 20, § 2 (emphasis added). 
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There are practical implications to the argument that the civil realm is 
deeply shaped and sustained by both natural law reasoning, which ostensibly 
is available to all, and divine revelation, which is available only to those 
whose hearts and intellect have been aligned with the will of God. Consider 
the possibility of mercy or equity in the civil realm, for example. Following 
Aristotle, Calvin distinguished between summum ius (“law applied to the 
letter”) and aequitas (“application of law taking into account extenuating 
circumstances”) and suggested the two can conflict.112 Calvin defines 
aequitas broadly and insists that it is not only God’s guiding principle but 
also that it should guide the natural law reasoning of magistrates in their 
exercise of civil functions.113   
If one takes seriously both Book II and Book IV of Calvin’s Institutes, 
it seems that Calvin wants for aequitas to be, on the one hand, the result of 
divine revelation or insight, in other words, an exception, and on the other 
hand to be the standard, or norm, for justice in the civil realm. Aequitas 
embodies Calvin’s conviction that God impinges upon the world of everyday 
experience in ways that cannot always be determined in advance.   
In this respect, Calvin can help modern Western societies make sense 
of some of the implicit values that have grounded our legal norms and 
practices. Even as the modern world has been secularized and disenchanted, 
norms continue to be subject to exceptions—although Western, secular 
societies seem to have fewer and fewer ways to explain or justify exceptional 
grants of mercy.114 Contemporary philosophers and legal theorists, for 
example, have made much of the so-called “mercy dilemma,”115 which asks 
whether mercy can exist without compromising, or being subsumed by, 
                                                     
112 See SENECA, supra note 56, at 181; see generally Martha Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 
22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83 (1993). 
113 See CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. IV, ch. 20, § 9. For a comprehensive discussion of the 
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114 In the world of political experience, executives issue pardons, legislatures grant amnesty, 
and juries nullify verdicts. This experience shows that abstract principles of justice do not 
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115 See generally Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162 
(First Paperback ed. 1990); H. Scott Hestevold, Disjunctive Desert, 20 AM. PHIL. Q. 357 
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justice. The problem goes something like this: reason establishes the 
principles of justice, and it ensures the fair application of those principles. 
Because reason’s requirements are binding, reason largely avoids the pitfalls 
of willfulness, sentimentality, and other forms of human error by establishing 
what is just prior to any particular set of circumstances. By making reason’s 
relationship to justice a formal, technical, and analytical matter, however, 
reason, it seems, renders moot—or at least insignificant—virtues of 
discernment or the possibility of divinely inspired grace. If mercy is a virtue 
with independent force, it would appear to compromise justice. And to 
harmonize mercy with justice seems likely to result in viewing mercy as 
merely redundant—as justice properly conceived.   
Calvin’s broad conception of aequitas is instructive, if not surprising.  
As discussed above, Calvin saw the law and gospel as intimately 
intertwined.116 Calvin’s ambivalence about the place of natural law reflects 
his general desire to keep distinct civil and heavenly realms, even while 
ultimately pointing to the unity of the two spheres. In so doing, Calvin 
reminds contemporary audiences that legalistic, world-maintaining, secular 
theories of law cannot always account for the legal practices that emerge from 
those systems. 
CONCLUSION 
Calvin and Calvinism are frequently credited with shaping the 
development of modern legal and political systems.117 This Article briefly 
outlines the argument for how Calvinism’s118 approach to law and civil life 
likely offered certain advantages when compared to the early modern 
alternatives of Catholics, Lutherans, and Anabaptists. This Article then points 
to reasons why, despite Calvin’s role in shaping early modern legal and 
political systems, there are constraints to his influence in law and civil 
                                                     
116 CALVIN, supra note 8, at bk. IV, ch. 20, § 2. 
117 See generally John McNeill, THE HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF CALVINISM (1970). For a 
more recent account, see John W. Sap, Paving the Way for Revolution: Calvinism and the 
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government in the contemporary West.119 This Article’s comments in this 
section are admittedly a bit cursory. The intent is not to provide a detailed or 
conclusive account of Calvinism’s role in early modern politics. Rather, this 
Article simply notes the conceptual plausibility of these claims, based on 
what has already been argued, and then reflects briefly on whether Calvin’s 
legacy remains viable in the twenty-first century. The goal of this Article is 
to show, even if inchoately, the relevance of this Article’s topic to 
contemporary legal and political thought so that, at the very least, legal 
theorists as well as practitioners take seriously what Robert Cover termed the 
“world-maintaining” as well as the “world-creating” functions of law.120 
Calvin and later Calvinists appear to have had good resources for 
holding in balance particular tensions between civil and spiritual realms. 
Calvin’s theology provided a basis for valuing the civil realm of law without 
letting it overwhelm the heavenly realm of gospel. In so doing, Calvinism 
distinguished itself from Catholic, Lutheran, and Anabaptist alternatives. 
Both, early modern and modern Catholics were slower than the Reformers of 
Europe to separate civil and religious realms, likely resulting in the slower 
development of an autonomous civil sphere in Catholic countries of 
Europe.121 Lutherans, like Calvin, recognized a distinction between civil and 
heavenly realms, but were much less likely than Calvin to appreciate the ways 
in which each realm was linked to the other. As a result, the laws of the civil 
realm lacked the sense of vitality and sacredness that they did for Calvin.122 
In contrast to Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists, Anabaptists largely 
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advocated withdrawal from the civil realm altogether.123 As a result, their 
imprint on the development of law and politics during the early modern 
period was mostly indirect. 
Onlookers have been particularly interested in tracing connections 
between Calvinism and republicanism, a connection most plausibly 
evidenced by observing the deep respect accorded to the legal and political 
institutions that developed through the influence of Calvinism.124 We are 
regularly reminded, however, that Calvin’s world is not our own. 
Republicanism of the early modern era has given way to new varieties of 
democratic liberal individualism, resulting in a civil realm that has largely 
been desacralized. Public institutions rarely make claims to represent or to 
promote spiritual ends or values.   
In Calvin’s schematization, law structured freedom by ensuring order 
amidst chaos. Law restrains but it also educates and enables. It is only able to 
do so, however, by orienting freedom towards particular ends. As these ends 
became plural, liberty increasingly came to be understood in negative, rather 
than positive terms. In other words, liberty came to be understood as the 
absence of constraints rather than the capacity to connect one’s empirical 
desires with an authentic self.125 Since law has now largely come to be 
defined in terms of limits, as a tool for social control and not a source of 
meaning, and since freedom is defined by the absence of restraint, law only 
has the possibility of being viewed negatively.   
Removed as they are from Calvin’s day in time and metaphysical 
assumptions, the modern and post-modern worlds have experienced an ironic 
inversion of ultimacy. The common ends that once united spiritual and civil 
realms have been privatized as those ends have come to be seen as 
controversial and plural, rather than unifying and common. Acknowledging 
the diversity of ends resulted in increased attention to uniform rules and 
procedures. Since there was no longer any agreement about what teloi 
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mattered for society, law gradually lost its aspirational features and simply 
became a way to limit and punish uncivil and criminal behavior.126   
Perhaps the clearest emblem of these changed attitudes towards law 
can be found in the legal positivism of Oliver Wendell Holmes and his 
familiar description of the “bad man.” 
[A] bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to 
avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore you 
can see the practical importance of the distinction between 
morality and law. A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule 
which is believed and practised by his neighbors is likely 
nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay 
money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can.127 
It is of course not this Article’s argument that the law’s separation 
from morality has been complete, either rhetorically or practically. Ronald 
Dworkin, as simply one prominent example, spent his career resisting the 
notion that law and morality could or should be separated, and instead pointed 
to the moral foundations and implications of law.128 With a legal culture that 
reflects and perpetuates the so-called “Great Separation” between law and 
meaning,129 there seems to be a clear need to (re)consider the latent supports 
that ensure loyalty to legal systems in liberal societies, despite what appears 
to be a fairly thin basis for that loyalty. 
The preceding pages have offered the work of John Calvin as one 
resource for better understanding some of the unspoken and implicit values 
that shape western legal practices. The formal separation, but ultimate unity, 
of civil and heavenly spheres and of norm with vision, articulated by Calvin, 
allowed him to be both idealistic and realistic about the law’s capacity. The 
development of western legal and political thought in the modern and 
contemporary eras likely benefited from Calvin’s recognition of the law’s 
limits as well as its capacities. If there is anything that the contemporary 
                                                     
126 See William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516, 525–26 (1995). 
Different strands of liberalism have failed in different ways to maintain aspirational features 
of the law. See id. So-called Enlightenment liberalism kept certain aspirational features of 
the law but proved incapable of acknowledging or appreciating diversity. See id. So-called 
Post-Reformation liberalism acknowledged diversity and pluralism but gave up the 
aspirational elements of the law—since no common telos grounded the community. See id. 
On the differences between these two strands of liberalism. See id.  
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128 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
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world should draw from Calvin’s writing on the law, it is that law is a richer 
resource than is often realized. At its best, it performs multiple functions. Law 
limits and enables; it punishes but also educates. 
